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Empiricism and Rationalism
in Nineteenth-Century Histories of Philosophy
Alberto Vanzo
This paper traces the ancestry of a familiar narrative of early modern phi-
losophy, one that dominated the English-speaking world throughout the
twentieth century.1 According to this narrative, which I will call the stan-
dard narrative, the early modern period was marked by the development of
two rival schools: the rationalism of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz (DSL)
and the empiricism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume (LBH). Rationalists are
said to claim that we have substantive a priori knowledge of the world and,
typically, that we have non-empirical concepts. Empiricists claim that all
our substantive knowledge of the world and all our concepts are grounded
on experience.2 The early modern period came to a close once Immanuel
I would like to thank Peter Anstey, Timmy de Goeij, Tom Sorell, and audiences at the
University of Otago for valuable comments on earlier versions of this article. This
research was supported by a Marie Curie International Incoming Fellowship within the
7th European Community Framework Programme.
1 See, e.g., Robert Adamson, The Development of Modern Philosophy, ed. W. R. Sorley
(Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1903); Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1945); Frederick C. Copleston, A History of Philosophy (Lon-
don: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1946–75), vols. 4–6; the thematic organization of
the Routledge History of Philosophy, general eds. G. H. R. Parkinson and S. G. Shanker
(London: Routledge, 1993–99), vols. 4–6; Roger Scruton, A Short History of Modern
Philosophy, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2002).
2 I adopt these characterizations of empiricism and rationalism because they are routinely
found in the texts that are the object of this study, e.g., Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann,
Geschichte der Philosophie (Leipzig: Barth, 1798–1819), vol. 11 (1819), 516; Francis
Bowen, Modern Philosophy (New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Company, 1877), 164;
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Kant, being neither an empiricist nor a rationalist, combined the insights of
empiricists and rationalists in his Critical philosophy, starting the new eras
of German idealism and late modern philosophy.
Although this narrative is still widespread in textbooks and entrenched
in the curriculum, many scholars have rejected it since Louis Loeb and
David Fate Norton voiced their misgivings in two influential studies.3
According to its critics, the standard narrative has many flaws: among oth-
ers, paying too much attention to epistemological issues;4 underestimating
the importance of debates in other areas, from natural philosophy to poli-
tics;5 mistaking empiricists for rationalists, rationalists for empiricists, and
authors whose thought combines rationalist and empiricist elements for
exponents of only one movement;6 and creating arbitrary partitions that
conceal the degree to which so-called empiricists such as Berkeley and
Hume held the same views as so-called rationalists such as Malebranche
and Leibniz.7
How did the standard narrative manage to pervade histories of philos-
ophy and undergraduate curricula, and become part of the shared as-
sumptions of the Anglophone academic community? Many critics of the
standard narrative have raised this question. Since they take it to be deeply
flawed, it was incumbent upon them to explain why philosophers came to
accept it. They typically claim that the standard narrative became standard
in the nineteenth century, that this was due to the influence of specific phi-
losophers and their philosophical agendas, and that those philosophers pro-
moted the standard narrative precisely because it served their agendas. As
John Grier Hibben, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (New York: Scribner’s Sons,
1910), 14. The recent literature has witnessed the appearance of several alternative char-
acterizations of empiricism and distinctions between various kinds of empiricism. See,
e.g., Donald Garrett, Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997), 29–38; Bas van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). As a result, how empiricism and rationalism are best
defined has become a contentious issue.
3 Louis E. Loeb, From Descartes to Hume: Continental Metaphysics and the Develop-
ment of Modern Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981); David Fate Norton,
‘‘The Myth of British Empiricism,’’ History of European Ideas 1 (1981): 331–44.
4 Stephen Gaukroger, The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility (Oxford:
Clarendon, 2010), 156.
5 Knud Haakonssen, ‘‘The Idea of Early Modern Philosophy,’’ in Teaching New Histories
of Philosophy, ed. J. B. Schneewind (Princeton: University Center for Human Values,
2004), 102, 109–14.
6 See, e.g., Desmond M. Clarke, Descartes’ Philosophy of Science (Manchester: Manches-
ter University Press, 1982) on Descartes’s empiricism; Harry M. Bracken, Berkeley (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1974), 15–17, 259, on Berkeley’s rationalism.
7 See, e.g., Stephen H. Daniel, ‘‘The Harmony of the Leibniz-Berkeley Juxtaposition,’’ in
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to who those philosophers were, there are vast disagreements. The three
most prominent candidates are Thomas Reid;8 Immanuel Kant and his dis-
ciples, including Kantian historians of philosophy such as Wilhelm Gottlieb
Tennemann9 and Kuno Fischer;10 and ‘‘Hegelian idealism in Germany and
Great Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century,’’11 especially
Thomas Hill Green.12 To Reid, the narrative is said to have furnished a
polemical target in ‘‘the emergence of skepticism in modern thought.’’13 To
Kant and his followers, the narrative is said to provide ‘‘a genealogy of all
earlier philosophy whereby certain problems irresolvable in earlier systems
can be seen to be finally and definitively resolved only by adopting the Kan-
tian project.’’14 To Hegelians and British idealists, the narrative is said to
provide a dialectical account of early modern thought as unfolding from a
rationalist thesis, through an empiricist antithesis, to Kant’s Critical synthe-
sis. It is also meant to show that Locke’s empiricism, portrayed as an alter-
native to idealism, leads to Hume’s skepticism, which must be rejected
because it makes ‘‘philosophy impossible.’’15
This paper aims to provide a more accurate picture of the spread of the
standard narrative. I argue that the narrative did not become standard in
the nineteenth century, but at the turn of the twentieth century, between
1895 and 1915. This was not due to the decisive influence of a single
author, be it Reid, Kant, Tennemann, Fischer, Green, or other Hegelians.
Reid cannot be responsible for the success of the standard narrative because
his account of modern thought does not have any of its distinctive features
(§1). The standard narrative is, by and large, a Kantian narrative. It is based
on Kant’s historiographical sketches, as corrected and integrated by Karl
Leonhard Reinhold (§2), and it was first fleshed out into full-fledged histor-
ies by two Kantian historians, Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann and Johann
Leibniz and the English-Speaking World, ed. Pauline Phemister and Stuart Brown (Dor-
drecht: Springer, 2007), 163–80.
8 Norton, ‘‘Myth,’’ 331–33; Haakonssen, ‘‘Idea,’’ 102–8.
9 See, e.g., Richard H. Popkin, ‘‘Did Hume Ever Read Berkeley?,’’ Journal of Philosophy
56 (1959): 544–45; Haakonssen, ‘‘Idea,’’ 102–3; Gregorio Piaia, ‘‘European Identity and
National Characteristics in the Historia philosophica of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries,’’ Journal of the History of Philosophy 35 (1996): 602–3.
10 Gaukroger, Collapse, 155.
11 Loeb, From Descartes, 30.
12 Norton, ‘‘Myth,’’ 331–33; Donald Garrett, ‘‘Philosophy and History in the History of
Modern Philosophy,’’ in The Future for Philosophy, ed. Brian Leiter (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004), 49.
13 Haakonssen, ‘‘Idea,’’ 106.
14 Gaukroger, Collapse, 156.
15 Norton, ‘‘Myth,’’ 333.
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Gottlieb Buhle. However, their direct influence on the English-speaking
world was modest. Numerous authors, several of whom were not Kantians,
spread the narrative in the English-speaking world. Among them are Kuno
Fischer, Friedrich Ueberweg, Richard Falckenberg, and Wilhelm Windel-
band (§3). Some of their works were widely read, but this did not suffice to
make the narrative standard in the nineteenth century. From the 1860s to
the 1890s, the account of German Hegelians and British idealists was at
least as popular as theirs (§3). Since their account differs remarkably from
the standard narrative, they neither endorsed nor promoted it, although
Green might have facilitated the acceptance of some of its components (§4).
I conclude by identifying some of the factors that contributed to the success
of the narrative (§5).
I. REID
For Knud Haakonssen and David Fate Norton, one of the most prominent
philosophers who contributed to the standard narrative is Thomas Reid.
Haakonssen holds that Reid, together with Kant, ‘‘laid down’’ the ‘‘episte-
mological paradigm.’’ This is a ‘‘pattern of philosophical history’’ that
includes the standard narrative as it divides ‘‘post-Renaissance philosophy
into two major schools or directions—namely, rationalism and empiri-
cism.’’16 In Norton’s view, Reid was the first to develop an account of
empiricism by composing ‘‘the ‘Locke begat Berkeley, and Berkeley begat
Hume’ part’’ of that narrative.17 Additionally, according to Haakonssen,
Reid promoted the view that philosophy is ‘‘concerned essentially with the
justification of beliefs and judgments.’’ ‘‘[S]uch justification’’ is understood
‘‘in terms of events, whether perceptive or inferential, in the mind—or as if
in the mind—of the individual person.’’18
In this section, I discuss to what extent Reid could have contributed to
the spread of the standard narrative. I will not assess Haakonssen’s claim
that Reid promoted a view of philosophy as concerned with a certain kind
of epistemological justification because one can consistently promote such
a view while denying that the development of early modern philosophy is
best explained in terms of the standard narrative. For instance, one could
agree with Victor Cousin that the main movements of early modern philos-
ophy were not LBH’s empiricism and DSL’s rationalism, but Bacon’s and
16 Haakonssen, ‘‘Idea,’’ 101, 103.
17 Norton, ‘‘Myth,’’ 331.
18 Haakonssen, ‘‘Idea,’’ 101.
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Locke’s (not Berkeley’s or Hume’s) sensualism, Descartes’s and Berkeley’s
idealism, Bayle’s and Hume’s skepticism, and Swedenborg’s and Jacobi’s
mysticism.19
In order to determine Reid’s contribution to the narrative, it is helpful
to consider four of its distinctive features and establish which of them Reid
endorsed. The features are:
(1) the distinction between empiricism and rationalism;
(2) the standard groupings of LBH and DSL;
(3) the claim that later empiricists and rationalists built on premises
laid out by their predecessors within their movement. For instance,
Berkeley’s rejection of material substance and Hume’s skepticism
towards spiritual substance may be said to derive from Locke’s
assumptions;
(4) the claim that Kant’s philosophy synthesizes doctrines of the
empiricists and the rationalists.
As for (1), the only occurrences of ‘‘empiricism,’’ ‘‘empiricist,’’ ‘‘ratio-
nalism,’’ or ‘‘rationalist’’ that I have found in Reid’s works are in William
Hamilton’s nineteenth-century editorial apparatus.20 If Reid’s works distin-
guish between empiricism and rationalism, they use different terms. As a
matter of fact, Reid singles out two groups of philosophers. The first group
includes the adherents of Descartes’s ‘‘ideal system.’’21 This is the view that
we perceive external objects by becoming aware of mental items, which
Reid calls ideas. Besides Descartes, Reid focuses on four modern adherents
of the ideal system: Locke, Malebranche, Berkeley, and Hume. The second
group includes the followers of common sense. Could the two groups be
Reid’s versions of empiricism and rationalism?
According to the standard narrative, what makes philosophers ratio-
nalists or empiricists is whether they claim or deny that we have substantive
a priori knowledge of the world and, typically, non-empirical concepts.
19 Victor Cousin, Introduction a l’histoire de la philosophie [1828], in Oeuvres (Brussels:
Socie´te´ belge de librairie, 1840–41), 1:1–349; translated as Introduction to the History
of Philosophy, trans. Henning Gottfried Lindberg (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, Little, Wilkins,
1832); Cousin, Cours de philosophie [1829], in Oeuvres, 1:353–452; translated as
Course of the History of Modern Philosophy, trans. O. W. Wright (Edinburgh: Clark,
1852).
20 See, e.g., William Hamilton, ‘‘Memoranda for Preface,’’ in The Works of Thomas Reid,
ed. Hamilton, 6th ed. (Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart, 1863), 1:xv.
21 Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense,
ed. Derek R. Brookes (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996 [1764]), 23.
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Reid groups neither the Cartesians nor the supporters of common sense
based on their views on these issues. Reid’s Cartesians include authors for
whom we have substantive a priori knowledge and non-empirical concepts,
such as Descartes and Malebranche, as well as authors who deny both
claims, such as Locke and Hume. Reid’s supporters of common sense are
those who, regardless of their views on a priori knowledge and non-
empirical concepts, reject a representational theory of perception in favor
of direct realism. Hence, Reid’s distinction between Cartesians and sup-
porters of common sense is not a version of the empiricism/rationalism dis-
tinction. That distinction just cannot be found in Reid’s works.
As for (2), although Reid includes LBH among the Cartesians, he
includes Descartes and Malebranche in the same category. The second
group does not include any of LBH or DSL, but only Reid and whoever,
among his readers, accepts his proposals. None of the two groups corre-
sponds even vaguely to those of the standard narrative.
What we do find in Reid’s works is something close to (3). According to
Reid, after Descartes put forward a representational theory of perception,
Malebranche and Locke argued that sensations of secondary qualities ‘‘are
not resemblances of any thing in bodies.’’22 Reid takes this claim, combined
with the ideal system, to entail that secondary qualities are not ‘‘real qualities
of body.’’23 Berkeley extended this view to all sensible qualities.24 He con-
cluded that, given Descartes’s and Locke’s assumptions, ‘‘no sensation what-
ever could possibly resemble any quality of an insentient being, such as body
is supposed to be.’’25 Berkeley avoided this conclusion by claiming that mate-
rial bodies are mental entities. Hume embraced skepticism with regard to the
existence of material bodies and extended it to the existence of minds.26
This account of the development of philosophy from Descartes to
Hume recalls a common claim of the upholders of the standard narrative
at least since Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann. This is the claim that Berkeley’s
attack on material substance and Hume’s attack on spiritual substance are
the two stages through which the skepticism inlaid in Locke’s views is grad-
ually brought to light. Nevertheless, this view differs from Reid’s because
Reid does not hold that Hume’s idealism depends on any distinctively Lock-
ean or empiricist assumptions. According to Reid, Humean ‘‘scepticism
22 Reid, Inquiry, 93.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., 94; see Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, ed. Knud Haakonssen
and Derek R. Brookes (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001 [1785]), 156.
25 Reid, Inquiry, 209–10.
26 Reid, Essays, 162.
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is inlaid’’ in ‘‘Des Cartes’ system of the human understanding,’’ which
was ‘‘very universally received’’27 by ‘‘all Philosophers, from Plato to Mr
Hume.’’28 The adherents of the standard narrative focus on developments
from Descartes to Leibniz and from Locke to Hume. Reid identifies a path
to skepticism that cuts across standard partitions and unfolds from Des-
cartes and Malebranche to Berkeley and Hume.
The conclusion of Reid’s narrative is that we can avoid skepticism by
abandoning the ideal system and endorsing common sense philosophy.
Some followers of the standard narrative make a similar claim, namely, that
Kant avoided Humean skepticism by developing his Critical philosophy.
Despite this analogy with the standard narrative, Reid’s account of modern
thought includes neither (4), nor any claim analogous to it. Reid never men-
tions Kant and he does not favor a higher synthesis of opposed standpoints.
He utterly rejects one of them, the ideal system, and endorses its opposite,
common sense philosophy.
On the whole, despite some similarities between Reid’s account and
the standard narrative, Reid endorses none of its four distinctive features.
Even if, as Haakonssen claims, Reid promoted certain broad attitudes
towards philosophy that are shared by the standard narrative, he cannot be
responsible for the success of that specific narrative, as opposed to others,
because he does not endorse its distinctive features.
II. KANT AND REINHOLD
Kant’s works contain several elements of the standard narrative. Kant con-
trasts empiricism with what he calls noologism and, later, rationalism.29
He classes Leibniz as a rationalist, Locke and Hume as empiricists, and he
interprets some of their doctrines in the light of their empiricism or ratio-
nalism.30 Nevertheless, as I argued elsewhere,31 Kant’s texts depart from the
standard narrative in significant respects. Most notably, Kant does not
regard Bacon or Berkeley as empiricists and Descartes, Malebranche, or
27 Reid, Inquiry, 12, 23.
28 Reid, Essays, 105, see 132.
29 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft [1781/1787], in Gesammelte Schriften (Ber-
lin: Reimer/de Gruyter, 1900–), 3:A854/B882; Kant, Welches sind die wirklichen Fort-
schritte, die die Metaphysik [ . . . ] gemacht hat? [1793], in Gesammelte Schriften, 20:275.
30 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in Gesammelte Schriften, 3:A854/B882; Kritik der
praktischen Vernunft, in Gesammelte Schriften, 5:13, 50–53.
31 Alberto Vanzo, ‘‘Kant on Empiricism and Rationalism,’’ History of Philosophy Quar-
terly 30, no. 1 (2013): 53–74.
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Spinoza as rationalists. He does not provide any account of the develop-
ment of rationalism. He regards himself as a particular kind of rationalist,
rather than a synthesizer of empiricism and rationalism as such. Kant’s
early supporters and opponents viewed Kant in the same way as they dis-
puted the superiority of Lockean empiricism or Kantian rationalism.32
The first author to place Kant over and above empiricism and rational-
ism was Karl Leonhard Reinhold. After emerging as a prominent advocate
of Kant’s philosophy in the late 1780s, Reinhold developed his own Kant-
inspired system, Elementary Philosophy, from 1790 to 1794. Following
Kant, Reinhold held that Locke and Leibniz ‘‘laid down, one in the simple
representations drawn from experience and the other in innate representa-
tions,’’ ‘‘the only foundation of philosophical knowledge possible for the
empiricists and the rationalists.’’33 Yet for Reinhold, in contrast to Kant,
the conflict between their views did not give way to a higher, Critical form
of rationalism. It prompted a skeptical crisis, which was overcome with the
appearance of a ‘‘fully new’’34 philosophical standpoint: ‘‘The insufficiency
of empiricism brought about rationalism, and the insufficiency of the latter
sustained the other in turn. Humean skepticism unveiled the insufficiency
of both of these dogmatic systems, and thus occasioned Kantian criti-
cism.’’35 Kant’s criticism ‘‘unifies the acclaimed but contradictory view-
points from which Locke and Leibniz investigated the human spirit.’’36 It
puts ‘‘together whatever truth there is in Locke’s empiricism and in Leib-
niz’s rationalism,’’37 while avoiding the pitfalls of skepticism. It carries out
an Aufhebung of empiricism and rationalism, in the three Hegelian mean-
ings of the term: it goes beyond those positions, while removing their errors
and retaining their correct insights.
Since Kant’s and, to a greater extent, Reinhold’s works provide the
foundation of the standard narrative, we should ask if their direct influence
32 See, e.g., Christian Gottlieb Selle, ‘‘De la realite´ et l’ide´alite´ des objets de nos conois-
sances,’’ Memoires de l’Acade´mie Royale des Sciences et Belles-Lettres (1786–87), 577–
612.
33 Karl Leonhard Reinhold, U¨ber das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens [1791], in
Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Martin Bondeli (Basel: Schwabe, 2007–), 4:44, trans. in
Between Kant and Hegel, ed. George di Giovanni and H. S. Harris (Albany: SUNY Press,
1985), 52–103.
34 ‘‘[V]o¨llig neue.’’ Reinhold, Briefe u¨ber die Kantische Philosophie, vol. 1 [1790], in
Gesammelte Schriften, 2.1:107.
35 Reinhold, Fundament, 132.
36 ‘‘[ . . . ] vereiniget die großen aber einander entgegen gesetzten Gesichtspunkte, aus
welchen Locke und Leibnitz den menschlichen Geist untersucht haben.’’ Reinhold,
Briefe, 107.
37 Reinhold, Fundament, 56.
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determined its spread in the English-speaking world. There are four reasons
to rule this out. First, neither Kant nor Reinhold provided more than mere
sketches of history. Their influence was limited by the fact that they never
developed detailed accounts of early modern thought.
Second, Kant’s and Reinhold’s immediate influence declined signifi-
cantly from the mid-1790s onward. Reinhold himself abandoned Elemen-
tary Philosophy for Fichte’s idealism around 1795. With the tide turning in
favor of Fichte’s, Schelling’s, and Hegel’s systems, Kantianism and Elemen-
tary Philosophy went out of fashion even in Germany.
Third, British culture became nearly impermeable to German influence
from the late 1790s to the late 1820s. This was, to a significant extent, the
result of a vigorous campaign that British conservatives mounted against
German intellectuals. They attacked Goethe, Lessing, and Schiller in vari-
ous periodicals like the Anti-Jacobin Review. They accused Samuel Taylor
Coleridge of being a Jacobin for his trip to Germany in 1798–99 and for his
translation of Schiller’s Wallenstein, which received unanimously negative
reviews.38 In this context, Kant and his followers were regarded as uninter-
esting, obscure authors who were not worth studying. Dugald Stewart’s
statements are exemplary at this regard. In Stewart’s view, Cudworth’s dis-
tinction between sensibility and understanding is ‘‘far superior’’ to Kant’s,
‘‘both in point of perspicuity and of precision.’’39 As for the analysis ‘‘of
the origins of our most important simple notions,’’ not ‘‘much progress has
hitherto been made by the German metaphysicians,’’ whereas a ‘‘great deal
certainly has been accomplished by the late Dr. Reid.’’40 Kant’s ethics
resembles Kames’s, Beattie’s, and Oswald’s, but it is ‘‘infinitely more excep-
tionable than theirs.’’41
Fourth, Reinhold’s works were not translated and his Elementary
Philosophy went unnoticed in the British Isles. Kant found a few propagan-
dists and expositors, but their achievements were for the most part very
modest.42 Two exceptions are Henry Crabb Robinson and Samuel Taylor
Coleridge. Robinson’s short pieces on Kant were valuable. However, being
38 Giuseppe Micheli, ‘‘The Early Reception of Kant’s Thought in England 1785–1805,’’
in Kant and His Influence, ed. George MacDonald Ross and Tony McWalter (Bristol:
Thoemmes, 1990), 293–95.
39 Dugald Stewart, Dissertation exhibiting the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical and
Political Philosophy [1815–21], in Collected Works, ed. William Hamilton (Edinburgh:
Constable, 1854), 1:400.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 412.
42 Rene´ Wellek, Immanuel Kant in England, 1793–1838 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1931), 28–51, 164.
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published in the ‘‘obscure’’ and ‘‘unattractive’’ Monthly Review,43 they had
no impact. Coleridge, who had first-hand knowledge of Kant, praised him
in the Biographia literaria of 1816 and employed Kantian ideas in his corre-
spondence and some published writings.44 However, these were not strictly
philosophical works. While they influenced Anglican theologians, their
impact on British philosophers was negligible. Among Coleridge’s philo-
sophical works, the manuscripts of his lectures on the history of philosophy
were published only in 1949.45 Although they draw from Tennemann’s
Kant-inspired historiography, they do not employ the notions of empiricism
and rationalism.
It is only from the 1830s, when Britain opened itself to cultural influ-
ences from the Continent, that Kant’s views on the history of modern
thought could influence British writers. William Hamilton, the first British
philosopher who ‘‘genuinely assimilated some of Kant’s thoughts and
appropriated some of his ideas,’’ published his first piece on Kant in 1829.46
Around 1830, Thomas Carlyle published an influential set of papers on
German thought and literature that contributed to rising interest in Kant’s
philosophy. William Whewell introduced Kantian views in Cambridge in
the 1830s.47 More importantly for our purposes, the first English edition of
Tennemann’s Manual of the History of Philosophy was published in
1832.48 Despite being poorly translated and omitting several sections of
the original, this volume made the Kant-inspired narrative of early modern
thought available to Anglophone readers. Several Kantian works were pub-
lished in the late 1830s, including the first complete translation of the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason, which contains Kant’s comments on the history of
empiricism and rationalism.
The rise of interest in Kant’s ideas and the wider availability of his
works in the 1830s and 1840s cannot explain how the standard narrative
came to dominate English histories of philosophy. As can be seen from table
1, several alternative historiographical narratives spread in the 1830s and
1840s. As a result, in the mid-1850s a learned British reader could hold,
with Dugald Stewart and Thomas Morell, that the central development of
43 Ibid., 143.
44 Ibid., 75–76, 111.
45 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Collected Works, vol. 8, Lectures 1818–1819, ed. J. R. de J.
Jackson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
46 Wellek, Kant, 51.
47 Micheli, ‘‘Reception,’’ 203.
48 Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie, 2nd ed. (Leip-
zig: Barth, 1816); translated as A Manual of the History of Philosophy, trans. Arthur
Johnson (Oxford: Talboys, 1832), rev. J. R. Morell (London: Bohn, 1852).
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the early modern period was the triumph of experimental philosophy.49
One could follow George Henry Lewes in regarding the early modern
period as a series of failed attempts to develop a metaphysics, which ended
in a skepticism from which neither Reid nor Kant managed to escape.50
One could favor Frederick Denison Maurice’s strictly chronological
arrangement,51 or hold that the modern period was dominated by the
schools of Bacon, Descartes, and Leibniz;52 by Cartesianism, Lockean real-
ism, and Berkeley’s idealism;53 by sensualism, idealism, materialism, and
skepticism;54 or by LBH’s empiricism and DSL’s rationalism. It would take
several decades for the standard narrative to prevail over its competitors.
III. KANTIAN HISTORIANS: TENNEMANN AND FISCHER
It is often claimed that neither Kant nor Reinhold but the ‘‘German histori-
ans of philosophy of the late 18th and early 19th century constructed the
historical past of contemporary [Anglophone] philosophy’’ by spelling out
the standard narrative.55 Two historians could have played this role: Johann
Gottlieb Buhle and Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann. At the turn of the nine-
teenth century, these authors fleshed out Reinhold’s historical sketches into
detailed accounts of early modern philosophy based on the distinction
between empiricism and rationalism. These are the first histories of early
modern thought that resemble well-known twentieth-century accounts such
as those by Bertrand Russell and Frederick Copleston.56
In the same years, another author, Joseph-Marie Dege´rando, published
a multivolume history of philosophy that employs the notions of empiri-
cism and rationalism. However, Dege´rando’s account looks less familiar to
49 Stewart, Dissertation; Thomas Morell, Elements of the History of Philosophy and Sci-
ence (London: Holdsworth, 1827).
50 George Henry Lewes, A Biographical History of Philosophy (London: Cox, 1845–46).
51 Frederick Denison Maurice, ‘‘Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy,’’ in Encyclopædia
metropolitana (London, 1840), 2:45–674.
52 Louis Euge`ne Marie Bautain, An Epitome of the History of Philosophy, trans. C. S.
Henry (New York: Harper, 1841). Joseph-Marie Dege´rando proposed the same classifi-
cation four decades earlier. See his Histoire compare´e des syste`mes de philosophie rela-
tivement aux principes des connaissances humaines (Paris: Henrichs, 1804).
53 Albert Schwegler, A History of Philosophy in Epitome, trans. Julius H. Seelye (New
York: Appleton, 1856).
54 Cousin, Cours.
55 Popkin, ‘‘Hume,’’ 544–45.
56 Johann Gottlieb Buhle, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie (Go¨ttingen: Vanden-
hoeck und Ruprecht, 1796–1804); Buhle, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie (Go¨ttingen:
Mittwe/Ro¨we, 1800–1805); Tennemann, Geschichte; Tennemann, Grundriß.
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current-day readers than those by Tennemann and Buhle. Dege´rando relies
on two other conceptual pairs (dogmatism and skepticism, materialism and
idealism), besides empiricism and rationalism. He identifies not two but
three main groupings of early modern authors: Bacon’s, Descartes’s, and
Leibniz’s schools. He grafts the notions of empiricism and rationalism into
an account that praises eclecticism and promotes an ‘‘experimental philoso-
phy’’ inspired by Bacon and Condillac. He surveys the history of philoso-
phy twice, first chronologically and then systematically, on the basis of his
taxonomy of philosophical systems.57 Buhle’s and Tennemann’s histories,
instead, do not have any of these unusual features. Was the spread of the
standard narrative in the English-speaking world due to their influence?
Between Buhle and Tennemann, only the latter was influential in Great
Britain—not for his interesting, twelve-volume History of Philosophy, but
for his brief Manual of the History of Philosophy. This work identifies
empiricism and rationalism as the main early modern movements. It classi-
fies LBH (along with Bacon and Hobbes) as empiricists and DSL (along
with Malebranche) as rationalists. It claims that Berkeley and Hume built
on Lockean premises, whereas Spinoza and Leibniz followed ‘‘the specula-
tive direction of the Cartesian school.’’58 It portrays Kant as the philosopher
who went beyond these movements and reached a ‘‘higher point of view.’’59
Its French translation by Victor Cousin had wide circulation throughout
Europe and even in North America.60 Its poor English translation of 1832
was followed by an improved English edition that appeared in 1852 and
was reprinted at least three times in the 1870s.61
The popularity of Tennemann’s textbook plays some part in explaining
why the standard narrative of early modern thought became widespread.
However, as table 1 shows, Tennemann is only one of several historians
who embraced the standard narrative, at a time when it was competing
with several alternatives. Among the adherents of the standard narrative,
Kuno Fischer is often seen as the real source of the standard historiography.
For instance, Stephen Gaukroger claims that Fischer ‘‘supplied the defini-
tive version of the modern account of the development of philosophy in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.’’62 He holds that the empiricism/
57 Dege´rando, Histoire compare´e.
58 Tennemann, Grundriß, 289.
59 Ibid., 355.
60 Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, Manuel de l’histoire de la philosophie, trans. Victor
Cousin (Paris: Pichon et Didier, 1829).
61 See table 2.
62 Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography (1995; repr., Oxford: Claren-
don, 2003), 6.
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TABLE 1: Histories of philosophy, published in English in the nineteenth century,
which contain discussions of early modern philosophy. Only first editions are
recorded, including English translations of foreign works. The nineteenth-century
reprints of an eighteenth-century work, Brucker/Enfield’s History of Philosophy
(1791), are not included. Lewes’s History of Philosophy from Thales to Comte
(1871) is not included because it is not a new work, but an enlarged version of his
Biographic History of Philosophy (1845–46). The table does not include histories
of philosophy published as journal articles or book chapters. Full bibliographic
details of the works cited in the tables are provided in the appendix on pp. 280–82.
rationalism distinction, ‘‘as it has been employed since the mid-nineteenth
century, derives’’ not from Tennemann, but from Fischer’s ‘‘Kantian-
inspired historiography.’’63
Fischer’s account of modern philosophy displays the four distinctive
features of the standard narrative mentioned above. It was developed in a
series of ten lengthy monographs published between 1852 and 1898. While
Fischer’s first two monographs emphasize the contrast between empiricism
or realism and idealism, his later works revolve around the contrast
between empiricism and rationalism.64 The first four and a half volumes
cover the ground from Bacon to Kant. Only parts of them were translated
into English: the shorter version of the volume on Bacon, the two volumes
on Descartes and his disciples, and portions of those on Spinoza and Kant.65
63 Gaukroger, Collapse, 155.
64 Compare Das classische Zeitalter der dogmatischen Philosophie (Mannheim: Basser-
mann & Mathy, 1854), 91, with Descartes und seine Schule (Munich: Basserman, 1878–
80), pt. 1, 143.
65 See Kuno Fischer, Francis Bacon of Verulam: Realistic Philosophy and Its Age, trans.
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As for Fischer’s interpretations of Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume,
Anglophone readers could only read the brief overviews offered in the last
chapter of the book on Bacon. They had no access to Fischer’s views on
Leibniz and on substantial portions of Spinoza’s and Kant’s philosophies.
Given that much of Fischer’s history of modern philosophy was not
translated into English and that few Anglophone readers could read Ger-
man, Fischer’s works alone cannot have ‘‘supplied’’66 the standard narra-
tive to English-speaking readers. Fischer’s influence was also limited by the
fact that his works were too detailed and advanced to be used as textbooks.
Fischer himself warned those approaching his volumes that they better
served the learned than the learner.67
This is not to say that Fischer’s works had no influence whatsoever on
the spread of the standard narrative. German historians such as Falcken-
berg and Ueberweg, whose works were translated into English in the 1870s
and 1880s, had read Fischer’s works. Moreover, some Anglophone authors
of standard histories of philosophy were familiar with Fischer’s German
works. John Hibben makes several references to them and Paul Thilly stud-
ied in Heidelberg with Fischer.68 However, Fischer’s influence should not be
overestimated. As we shall see in section 5, it is only at the turn of the
twentieth century, between 1895 and 1915, that the standard narrative
became standard. The references, bibliographies, and suggested readings of
the histories of philosophy published in those years contain several men-
tions of historians who follow the standard narrative, typically including
Falckenberg and Windelband. Yet they contain few mentions of Fischer.69 It
was not only or mainly Fischer, but a number of historians who collectively
‘‘supplied’’70 the standard narrative to Anglophone readers.
John Oxenford (London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, & Roberts, 1857);
Fischer, Descartes and His School, ed. Noah Porter (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1887);
Fischer, ‘‘The Life and Character of Baruch Spinoza,’’ trans. in Spinoza: Four Essays, ed.
William A. Knight (London: Williams and Norgate, 1882), 75–127; Fischer, A Commen-
tary on Kant’s Critick of the Pure Reason, trans. John Pentland Mahaffy (London: Long-
mans, Green, & Co., 1866); Fischer, A Critique of Kant, trans. W. S. Hough (London:
Swan Sonnenschein, 1888).
66 Gaukroger, Descartes, 6.
67 Fischer, Zeitalter, iv.
68 Hibben, Enlightenment; ‘‘Guide to the Frank Thilly Papers, 1889–1935,’’ the Division
of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library (August 2009), collection
no. 14–21–623, http://rmc.library.cornell.edu/EAD/htmldocs/RMA00623.html (archived
at http://www.webcitation.org/6ZBEMZp2F).
69 See, e.g., Walter T. Marvin, A Syllabus of an Introduction to Philosophy (New York:
Macmillan, 1899), vi, and the references in Herbert Ernest Cushman, A Beginner’s His-
tory of Philosophy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1910–11), 2:17.
70 Gaukroger (Descartes, 6) employs this term with reference to Fischer.
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TABLE 2: Texts mentioned in table 1, their reprints and later editions. Subscripted
numbers indicate publication years of reprints and later editions.
The publication of several histories that follow the narrative did not
suffice to make it standard. As table 1 shows, most of the new histories of
philosophy published in the 1890s follow the standard narrative. This may
lead one to think that, perhaps due to the influence of Tennemann’s,
Fischer’s, and Ueberweg’s histories, the standard narrative was firmly pre-
vailing by the 1890s. However, things look different if we consider not only
first editions, but also later editions and reprints. These are included in table
2. In each decade from 1850 to 1900, more histories of philosophy that
followed the Hegelian narrative were published or reprinted than those that
followed the standard narrative. The two English translations of Albert
Schwegler’s Hegelian History of Philosophy in Epitome, published in Edin-
burgh and New York, were reprinted 36 times, far more than any other
history of philosophy.71
The unprecedented success of Schwegler’s History on both sides of the
71 Its American translation (Schwegler, History) was reprinted 23 times in the nineteenth
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Atlantic explains why no new Hegelian histories of philosophy were pub-
lished in the 1870s and 1880s, while British idealism was in full swing. This
is not due to a lack of interest in Hegel’s narrative, but to the virtues of
Schwegler’s History. It is well written, accessible to students and laypeople,
and short enough to be used as a textbook. Its pronounced Hegelian narra-
tive is in line with the idealist tendencies that were gaining popularity in the
second half of the century. In the light of these features and its many
reprints, we should not be surprised by a historian’s claim that ‘‘[b]y far the
most popular history of philosophy’’ in the 1880s was not one by Tenne-
mann or Fischer, but ‘‘that of Albert Schwegler.’’72 The success of Hegelian
histories shows that, despite the wide availability of histories based on the
standard narrative, that narrative was not yet standard by the 1890s. If that
had been the case, Hegelian histories would have been far less widespread
than they were.
Despite the many reprints of Hegelian histories, more new histories of
early modern philosophy followed the standard narrative than the Hegelian
narrative during the 1890s. However, they did not do as much to spread
the standard narrative as the Hegelian histories did to spread their favored
narrative. This is because, while the Hegelian narrative was very pro-
nounced in the three histories of philosophy that followed it, most histories
that followed the standard narrative did not emphasize it73 or combined it
with original features that obscured it. For instance, Benjamin Burt’s
History of Modern Philosophy discusses many philosophers beyond the
empiricist and rationalist triads.74 He singles out a third, ‘‘intuitionalist’’
movement alongside empiricism and rationalism. He holds that some
authors (such as Richard Cumberland and Samuel Clarke) combined
empiricist and rationalist elements. He does not include others (e.g., Rich-
ard Price) in any movement. He does not portray Kant’s philosophy as the
crowning of the early modern period, but as one of several philosophical
options that were available after the late eighteenth century.
If we look at the historical overviews published in texts other than
histories of philosophy, such as journal articles and monographs, we can
century. Its British translation (Handbook of the History of Philosophy, trans. James
Hutchison Stirling [Edinburgh: Edmonston & Douglas, 1867]) was reprinted 13 times.
72 Ernest Belfort Bax, A Handbook of the History of Philosophy (London: Bell, 1886),
12.
73 Richard Falckenberg, History of Modern Philosophy, trans. A. C. Armstrong, Jr. (New
York: Holt, 1893); Wilhelm Windelband, A History of Philosophy (New York: Macmil-
lan, 1893).
74 See Benjamin Chapman Burt, A History of Modern Philosophy (Chicago: McClurg,
1892).
PAGE 268
268
................. 18873$ $CH4 05-11-16 11:56:09 PS
Vanzo ✦ Empiricism and Rationalism in Nineteenth-Century Histories
easily find original accounts.75 Philosophers writing in the 1880s and 1890s
were keenly aware of the many variations that could be found in the histor-
ies of their subject. Nicholas Murray Butler stressed such variations in an
article of 1886: ‘‘Bacon and Descartes are the universally acknowledged
pioneers of modern thought . . . As to the line of development from Bacon
and Descartes, various historians take very different views, and no two find
exactly the same sequence or use precisely the same nomenclature . . .’’76
Butler sketches various ways of carving the early modern period. Having
noted that the classification based on the empiricism/rationalism distinction
has the advantage of simplicity, he states that he favors the Hegelian classi-
fication without ever explaining why. This shows that, at that time, there
was the sense that alternative historiographical narratives could be applied.
None was taken to be, as a matter of course, the one that captured the real
schools or movements that shaped the early modern period.
IV. GERMAN HEGELIANS AND BRITISH IDEALISTS
The popularity of Hegelian histories until the end of the nineteenth century
lends plausibility to Louis Loeb’s view that the rise of the standard narrative
was due to the combined influence of Kuno Fischer’s works and those of
the German Hegelians and British idealists, especially Thomas Hill Green.77
More recently, Don Garrett has claimed that ‘‘British Idealist historians of
philosophy (particularly Green)’’ developed the standard narrative. They
elaborated a narrative according to which early modern philoso-
phy had consisted of two schools or movements: the ‘‘Continental
Rationalism’’ of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz; and the ‘‘British
Empiricism’’ of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. These movements
were then synthesized, on this account, by the critical philosophy
of Kant, which thereby superceded them.78
According to Loeb and Garrett, Green elaborated the standard narrative in
his widely read ‘‘General Introduction’’ to Hume’s Treatise, published in
75 See, e.g., Wm. T. Harris, ‘‘The History of Philosophy,’’ Journal of Speculative Philoso-
phy 10 (1876): 225–70.
76 Nicholas Murray Butler, ‘‘The Problem of Kant’s ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft,’ ’’ Journal
of Speculative Philosophy 20 (1886): 56–57.
77 Loeb, From Descartes, 31.
78 Garrett, ‘‘Philosophy,’’ 49; see Norton, ‘‘Myth,’’ 332–33.
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1874.79 However, as Alexander Klein has argued, our familiar categories of
empiricism and rationalism are foreign to Green’s introduction.80 Klein
notes that Green’s introduction never groups together even two among Des-
cartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, let alone all three. Green’s only mention of
Spinoza relates him to Berkeley.81 The few mentions of Leibniz relate him
to Hume and Kant, but not to Descartes or Spinoza.82 Green mentions
rationalism only once, when he praises Locke’s and Hume’s ‘‘readiness to
follow the lead of Ideas: their spirit was the spirit of Rationalism—the spirit
which, however baffled and forced into inconsistent admissions, is still gov-
erned by the faith that all things may ultimately be understood.’’83
This is hardly what philosophers mean when they call DSL Continental
rationalists and contrast them with British empiricists. Looking at the latter,
Green’s 299–page introduction does not call anyone an empiricist. It
employs the term ‘‘empiricism’’ four times,84 always in passing and always
with reference to Locke, never to Berkeley or Hume. Those four sentences
provide neither a perspicuous characterization of empiricism, nor one that
could be used to single out LBH and contrast them with DSL.85
Even if Green does not call LBH empiricists, he does group LBH
together in the introduction. He explains that Locke took ideas to be copies
of material things. Berkeley got rid of that assumption and regarded God
as the cause of our ideas.86 Hume deemed that assumption unnecessary and
provided yet another revision of Locke’s views.87 This is an account of how
Locke begat Berkeley and Berkeley begat Hume, analogous to the account
provided by Tennemann, Fischer, and other adherents of the standard nar-
rative. However, unlike them, Green does not focus on Locke’s, Berkeley’s,
and Hume’s views on ideas to criticize their empiricist assumptions. Green
never denies that all our substantive knowledge derives from experience,
nor does he claim that we have non-empirical concepts. He criticizes
Locke’s, Hume’s, and (more briefly) Berkeley’s views on ideas on another
ground, namely, because they do not acknowledge the contribution of the
79 Thomas Hill Green, ‘‘General Introduction,’’ in Works, ed. R. L. Nettleship (London:
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1894), 1:1–299.
80 Alexander Mugar Klein, The Rise of Empiricism: William James, Thomas Hill Green,
and the Struggle over Psychology (PhD dissertation, Indiana University, 2007), http://
hdl.handle.net/2022/7770 (archived at http://www.webcitation.org/6ZInyg6Vx), 36–51.
81 Green, ‘‘Introduction,’’ 292.
82 Ibid., 2, 3.
83 Ibid., 5.
84 Ibid., 98, 99, 185, 188.
85 Klein, Empiricism, 41–46.
86 Green, ‘‘Introduction,’’ 133.
87 Ibid., 159.
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understanding to cognition. According to Green, although the understand-
ing does not furnish us with any substantive a priori knowledge and does
not generate non-empirical concepts, it does elaborate the information pro-
vided by the senses. The importance of this activity is hard to overstate.
Our cognitions of the world are not generated by the senses alone, but by
the operations that the understanding performs on the deliverances of the
senses. LBH attempted to explain how we cognize the world ‘‘from sensa-
tion alone,’’ disregarding the contribution of the understanding. They over-
looked the fact that ‘‘in experience we already go beyond sense.’’88 They
failed to explain how we derive cognitions from sensations and paved the
way for skepticism.89
Green does not portray his attack against LBH as an attack against
their epistemology,90 but against their cognitive psychology, which he calls
‘‘empirical psychology.’’91 Green regards LBH as the ancestors of the empir-
ical psychologists of his own time: authors such as Herbert Spencer, G. H.
Lewes, and John Stuart Mill, who were his main philosophical foes.92 In
the introduction to Hume’s Treatise, Green opposes them indirectly, by
claiming that LBH made the same mistakes as nineteenth-century empirical
psychologists.93 In later publications, Green confronts them directly. He
does not question their empiricist view that all our knowledge and concepts
derive from experience, but he criticizes their disregard for the contribution
of the understanding to cognition.94 Green does not contrast the views of
LBH or their nineteenth-century followers with those of DSL, but with
those of Kant, Hegel, and himself, who acknowledge the contribution of
the understanding to cognition.
One may note that, although the empirical psychology criticized by
Green does not entail the empiricist epistemology of the standard narrative,
the two are natural allies. For this reason, those who accepted Green’s
grouping and genealogy of LBH for their empirical psychology might have
been favorably disposed to accept the narrative’s grouping and genealogy
88 Green, ‘‘Introduction,’’ 267.
89 See W. J. Mander, British Idealism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 62. On
the importance of the activity of the understanding, see, e.g., Thomas Hill Green, Prole-
gomena to Ethics, 5th ed., ed. A. C. Bradley (Oxford: Clarendon, 1906), §46. On the
impossibility of conceiving of experience independently from that activity, see ibid., §34.
For Green’s dismissal of external world skepticism, see ‘‘Mr Herbert Spencer and Mr
G. H. Lewes’’ [1877–79], in Works, 1:374, 376.
90 Mander, Idealism, 69.
91 Green, ‘‘Introduction,’’ 13, 19, 165.
92 Mander, Idealism, 66.
93 Green, ‘‘Introduction,’’ 7, 165.
94 Klein, Empiricism, 52–62, 149; Mander, Idealism, 66–67.
PAGE 271
271
................. 18873$ $CH4 05-11-16 11:56:11 PS
JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS ✦ APRIL 2016
of LBH for their empiricist epistemology. If so, Green had an indirect influ-
ence on the spread of the standard narrative. One might think that Green’s
influence was considerable, thanks to his prominent position as a teacher
and, later, professor in Oxford and to the success of his edition of Hume’s
Treatise. Yet I have not found clear evidence that Green’s influence in this
respect was significant. To begin with, none of the authors mentioned in
tables 3 and 4 (on page 275), who endorsed the standard narrative between
1895 and 1915, studied in Oxford with Green. Moreover, some of their
works refer to Green’s introduction in connection with LBH,95 but several
others do not.96 Finally, regardless of whether they were influenced by
Green’s introduction, they might have taken up the grouping and genealogy
of LBH from proponents of the standard account, to whom they owed their
account of DSL’s rationalism and the view that Kant synthesized empiri-
cism and rationalism.
Although, as we have seen, Green did not elaborate the standard narra-
tive of early modern philosophy, other works by German Hegelians and
British idealists might have done so. The most likely candidates are their
histories of philosophy. I will summarize the account of early modern
thought that can be found in the histories of philosophy by Hegel, Erd-
mann, Schwegler, and, with minor variations, in Caird’s monographs on
Kant.97
The account starts by declaring Bacon and Descartes ‘‘the founders of
modern philosophy.’’98 Bacon is described in conventional terms as ‘‘the
herald of empiricism.’’99 Descartes, who is given more importance than
Bacon, is portrayed differently than in typical twentieth-century accounts.
He is not the philosopher who made ‘‘epistemology the most basic sector
of the whole of philosophy,’’100 unfolding a ‘‘pure inquiry’’101 that provided
95 See, e.g., Arthur Kenyon Rogers, A Student’s History of Philosophy (New York: Mac-
millan, 1901), 358, 398; Hibben, Enlightenment, 57, 84, 101, 110.
96 See, e.g., Marvin, Syllabus; William Turner, History of Philosophy (Boston: Ginn,
1903); Cushman, History; A. W. Benn, History of Modern Philosophy (London: Watts,
1912).
97 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E. S.
Haldane and Frances H. Simson (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Tru¨bner, 1892–96), vol.
3; Johann Eduard Erdmann, A History of Philosophy, ed. Williston S. Hough (London:
Allen & Unwin, 1889–90), vol. 2; Schwegler, History; Edward Caird, A Critical Account
of the Philosophy of Kant (Glasgow: Maclehose, 1877); Caird, The Critical Philosophy
of Immanuel Kant (Glasgow: Maclehose, 1889).
98 Schwegler, History, 166.
99 Ibid., 169.
100 Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth,
1981), xxxiii.
101 Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (London: Penguin, 1978).
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an a priori, rationalist foundation for basic truths about God, humans, and
the world. Descartes’s central problem, which is the central problem of
modern philosophy, is overcoming the ‘‘opposition between Thought and
Being,’’ ‘‘subject and object,’’ ‘‘Nature and Mind.’’102
To that end, Descartes clears the ground from all prejudices and
employs the cogito to assert the reality of thought. He then relies on God’s
veracity to prove the existence of the material world. He attempts to estab-
lish its unity with thought by embracing occasionalism and making God
‘‘the intermediate bond of union’’ between mind and body.103 However,
Descartes’s substance dualism posits the ‘‘widest separation’’ between
them, a gulf too wide to be overcome.104 Spinoza, Descartes’s ‘‘direct suc-
cessor,’’105 removes this obstacle by rejecting substance dualism and build-
ing a monist system on Cartesian premises. In doing so, he reveals the most
defining feature of Descartes’s philosophy: not so much a rationalist stance,
but a theocentric tendency that finds full expression in Spinoza’s pan-
theism.106
At this point, the standard narrative introduces Leibniz’s philosophy
as a further development within Descartes’s and Spinoza’s movement. The
Hegelians, instead, see Spinoza as the last Cartesian. His pantheism paid
too much attention to the whole as compared with the individual, eliciting
an individualist reaction that took two forms: ‘‘a one-sided idealism, and a
one-sided realism.’’107 Schwegler and Erdmann, who simplify Hegel’s peri-
odization, place Leibniz and Berkeley among the idealists, Locke and Hume
among the realists.
The Hegelians trace the development of the two forms of individual-
ism, attempting to show that they both entail skepticism. They show how
‘‘the individual, conceived as immediately conscious of himself and of him-
self alone, is gradually driven to surrender all hold upon objective real-
ity.’’108 Kant saved philosophy from this skeptical shipwreck.109 He
synthesized realism with idealism, lifted ‘‘philosophy above’’ their ‘‘opposi-
tion,’’110 and started the new age of German idealism.
This Hegelian narrative has some elements in common with the stan-
dard narrative. It sees Kant as the synthesizer of opposing tendencies and it
102 Hegel, Lectures, 2:106–7.
103 Ibid., 3:251.
104 Schwegler, History, 192.
105 Hegel, Lectures, 3:252.
106 Erdmann, History, 3:6.
107 Schwegler, History, 193.
108 Caird, Critical Philosophy, 84.
109 Schwegler, History, 229.
110 Erdmann, History, 2:360.
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acknowledges that Spinoza followed Descartes, while Hume followed
Locke. However, the Hegelian narrative does not revolve around the
empiricism/rationalism distinction. It cuts across the groupings and geneal-
ogies of DSL and LBH. It portrays Leibniz more as an individualistic oppo-
nent of Descartes’s and Spinoza’s pantheism than as their follower. The
Hegelians note that Berkeley ‘‘followed the empiricism of Locke,’’ but they
stress that ‘‘we must place him in immediate succession’’ to Leibniz ‘‘as the
perfecter of a subjective idealism.’’111 The claim that the modern period
was dominated by the contrast between individualism and pantheism, the
theocentric interpretation of Descartes and Spinoza (but not Leibniz),
the teleological reading of early modern thinkers as striving to establish the
unity of mind and world make Hegelian histories significantly different
from the standard narrative that is spelled out in the works of Tennemann,
Fischer, Ueberweg, Falckenberg, and Windelband.112 Far from elaborating
the standard narrative, the account provided by German Hegelians and
British idealists was alternative to it. The standard narrative had to prevail
over the Hegelian narrative in order to become standard. When and why
did this happen?
V. BECOMING STANDARD
The standard narrative became standard in the English-speaking world at
the turn of the twentieth century, between 1895 and 1915. There are two
sources of evidence for this claim. In the first place, many new introductions
to philosophy and histories of philosophy that endorse the standard narra-
tive were published in those years. Those listed in table 3 contrast the Brit-
ish or even English empiricism of LBH with the Continental rationalism of
DSL. Those listed in table 4 also follow the standard narrative, although
they diverge from it in minor ways or they fail to explicitly classify all six
of LBH and DSL as either British empiricists or Continental rationalists.
For instance, George Stuart Fullerton’s list of main rationalists mentions
Descartes and Spinoza, but not Leibniz.113 Russell’s list in The Problems of
Philosophy includes Descartes and Leibniz, but omits Spinoza.114 Hibben’s
111 Schwegler, History, 221.
112 Tennemann, Geschichte; Tennemann, Handbuch; Fischer’s works cited above; Fried-
rich Ueberweg, A History of Philosophy, trans. G. S. Morris (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1872–73); Falckenberg, History; Windelband, History.
113 George Stuart Fullerton, An Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Macmillan,
1906), 206–8.
114 Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (New York: Holt, 1912), 41.
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TABLE 3: Introductions to philosophy and histories of philosophy published in
English between 1895 and 1915 that distinguish between empiricism and rational-
ism and mention the two triads of empiricists and rationalists. The last column lists
only the reprints and new editions published until 1915.
TABLE 4: Introductions to philosophy and histories of philosophy published in
English between 1895 and 1915 that follow the standard narrative, but diverge from
it in minor ways or fail to explicitly classify all six of LBH and DSL as empiricists
or rationalists. The last column lists only the reprints and new editions published
until 1915.
Philosophy of the Enlightenment is entirely in line with the standard narra-
tive. However, being limited to the eighteenth century, it does not discuss
Descartes and Spinoza.
In the second place, the early twentieth century saw a sharp decline in
the popularity of Hegelian histories, which had provided the main alterna-
tive to the standard narrative in the late nineteenth century. The histories
of modern philosophy by Erdmann, Hegel, and Schwegler had been
reprinted at least 24 times between 1880 and 1899. Between 1900 and
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1919, they were only reprinted seven times.115 Among the new histories of
modern philosophy, many followed the standard narrative. None followed
the Hegelian narrative.
The rise in the popularity of the standard narrative has three note-
worthy features. To begin with, it was not limited to either Great Britain
or the United States. New histories and introductions to philosophy that
conformed to the standard narrative were published on both sides of the
Atlantic.
Moreover, only a few of these texts were translations of German and
French works.116 The number of translations was significantly lower than
the number of works originally written in English. This indicates that the
standard narrative was no longer mostly a German export. By and large,
Anglophone writers had assimilated it. In 1908, the theologian Archibald
Alexander still lamented: ‘‘Hitherto the Germans would seem to have had
a monopoly in the writing of the history of philosophy. We have many
admirable translations, but very few original treatises.’’117 In the 1920s, this
complaint would no longer have been fair.
Finally, the standard narrative was spreading in classrooms as much as
in textbooks. Not by chance, most of the texts listed in tables 3 and 4 are
handy one- or two-volume manuals that were suitable for use in university
courses. Their primary aim was to be useful pedagogical tools rather than
to promote a specific philosophical outlook through their reading of the
early modern period. By 1913, as we can read in the Cyclopedia of Educa-
tion, ‘‘[c]ourses in special periods of modern philosophy such as Continen-
tal Rationalism (Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz) or British Empiricism
(Locke, Berkeley, and Hume)’’ were ‘‘given in most colleges having a devel-
oped department of philosophy.’’118 By now, the account based on the
empiricism/rationalism distinction was really the standard account of early
115 The second volume of Erdmann’s History, on pre-Kantian modern philosophy, was
reprinted in 1909, 1913, and 1915. Hegel’s Lectures and the British translation of
Schwegler’s textbook (Handbook) were not reprinted. The American translation of
Schwegler’s textbook (History) was reprinted in 1905, 1906, 1908, and 1913.
116 Friedrich Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, trans. Frank Thilly (New York: Holt,
1895); Alfred Weber, History of Philosophy, trans. Frank Thilly (New York: Scribner’s
Sons, 1896); Oswald Ku¨lpe, Introduction to Philosophy, trans. W. B. Pillsbury and E. B.
Titchener (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1897); Paul Janet and Gabriel Se´ailles, A History
of the Problems of Philosophy, ed. Henry Jones (London: Macmillan, 1902).
117 Archibald B. D. Alexander, review of Arthur Kenyon Rogers, A Student’s History of
Philosophy, Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method 5 (1908): 189.
118 Morris R. Cohen, ‘‘Philosophy,’’ in A Cyclopedia of Education, ed. Paul Monroe
(New York: Macmillan, 1913), 4:692.
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modern philosophy. Until the 1980s, few scholars would question its accu-
racy.
What made it possible for the standard narrative to become standard
in the early twentieth century? Its supporters will suggest that this was
because the narrative is correct or, at least, more plausible than its competi-
tors. In the light of the many recent criticisms of the standard narrative, this
is a very controversial suggestion that would require at least a full paper to
be assessed.
It is natural to think that the standard narrative became standard
because its main competitor, the Hegelian account, lost prominence follow-
ing the demise of British idealism. A pivotal year was 1903, ‘‘which saw
the appearance of Russell’s Principles of Mathematics, as well as Moore’s
Principia Ethica and ‘The Refutation of Idealism’, works which simultane-
ously attacked idealism and inaugurated the new ‘analytic’ philosophy.’’119
However, W. J. Mander’s careful study of British idealism shows that its
decline was slow and very gradual. F. H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet
were still central figures up until World War I.120 The decline of British
idealism was beneficial to the success of the standard narrative. Even so,
the Hegelian account of early modern thought lost popularity much more
quickly than British idealism as a whole.
One reason for the success of the standard narrative is that it offered
an attractive account of modern thought to those sympathetic with idealism
who, even before the demise of their movement, were dissatisfied by the
Hegelian narrative. There could be various reasons for this dissatisfaction.
For instance, one could doubt the Hegelians’ claims that Locke’s philoso-
phy is best seen as a reaction to Descartes’s and Spinoza’s pantheistic ten-
dency or that Berkeley is best placed alongside Leibniz, as an exemplar of
the idealist opposition to Locke’s and Hume’s realism, rather than along-
side Locke and Hume. The standard narrative did not make those claims
and had two additional advantages.
To begin with, it is simpler than the Hegelian narrative. A teacher who
followed that narrative had to portray the development of pantheism from
Descartes to Spinoza, describe the fortunes of the realistic individualism of
Locke and Hume and the idealistic individualism of Leibniz and Berkeley,
and finally explain how they gave rise to the idealism heralded by Kant.
The standard narrative provided a simpler bipartition of early modern
119 Mander, Idealism, 526.
120 Ibid., 526–56.
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thought, along with a shorter canon comprising only six main authors.
Their handy division into two groups of three authors each could be the
basis for a simple two-part overview of early modern thought.
Moreover, the standard narrative could easily accommodate the Hegel-
ian persuasion that historical developments unfold dialectically through
theses, antitheses, and syntheses. On the macro-level, the standard narrative
can be seen as singling out the rationalist thesis of DSL, the empiricist
antithesis of LBH, and the Kantian synthesis. On the micro-level, the stan-
dard narrative can accommodate various Hegelian triads. For instance, one
could portray Kant’s philosophical development as a departure from his
Leibnizian-Wolffian rationalism of the 1750s, through his Humean empiri-
cism of the 1760s, to an idealist synthesis of rationalist and empiricist
views. Hibben’s Philosophy of the Enlightenment is a good example of how
one can paint the standard narrative with Hegelian tones.
Being a Kantian or a Hegelian was no precondition for endorsing the
standard narrative. Philosopher-psychologists such as William James or
analytic philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, who were more sympathetic
to Locke and Hume than to Kant or Hegel, could appropriate the prima
facie factual component of the narrative while adjusting the evaluative com-
ponent to suit their philosophical persuasions. For instance, Russell could
criticize the errors of the rationalists, praise the advancements of empiri-
cism from Locke to Hume, and portray the Kantian synthesis as an unfortu-
nate interlude between the demise of Humean empiricism and the rise of
analytic philosophy. To be sure, there may be many reasons to doubt the
so-called factual component of the narrative. For instance, if we hold that
Hume was, in the first place, an exponent of the skeptical movement
sparked by Descartes’s Meditations and developed by Gassendi, Foucher,
and Bayle,121 it will be much harder to portray him as a precursor of Ayer
than if we regard him as a successor of Locke. But issues concerning the
correctness of this and other aspects of the standard narrative are far more
likely to arise for those engaged in detailed exegetical work than for those,
like Russell, who were looking for a ready-made account of early modern
thought to bend to their purposes. The standard narrative was well suited
to that end.
The adoption of the standard narrative by philosophers of very diverse
persuasions did not begin with William James or the early analytic philoso-
phers. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the narrative had been
endorsed by Friedrich Ueberweg, a critic of idealism;122 by Ernest Belfort
121 Popkin, ‘‘Hume,’’ 544.
122 Ueberweg, History.
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Bax, who combined an idealist metaphysics with a Marxist social philoso-
phy and an ethics indebted to Comte;123 and by Alfred Weber, a French
spiritualist who was influenced by positivism.124 All of these authors
regarded the standard narrative as correct, even though they rejected the
Kant-inspired philosophies of its first proponents. The tendency of non-
Kantian philosophers to appropriate the standard narrative continued well
into the twentieth century. The most successful twentieth-century histories
of philosophy, those by Bertrand Russell and Frederick Copleston, em-
ployed the standard narrative even though their authors had very different
philosophical views and neither of them were Kantians.
I conclude that the standard narrative did not become standard in the
nineteenth century, as scholars have claimed, but at the turn of the twenti-
eth century. This was not due to the influence of Reid, German Hegelians,
or British idealists, since they did not endorse the narrative, although
Thomas Hill Green may have facilitated its uptake. The narrative is based
on Kant’s historiographical sketches, as corrected and integrated by Karl
Leonhard Reinhold. It was first fleshed out into full-fledged histories by
two Kantians, Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann and Johann Gottlieb Buhle.
Numerous historians, several of whom were not Kantians, spread it in the
English-speaking world. They include Kuno Fischer, Friedrich Ueberweg,
Richard Falckenberg, and Wilhelm Windelband. However, the wide avail-
ability of their works did not suffice to make the narrative standard
because, until the 1890s, the Hegelian account was at least as popular as
theirs. Among the factors that allowed the narrative to become standard
are its aptness to be adopted by philosophers of the most diverse persua-
sions, its simplicity and its suitability for teaching.
University of Warwick.
123 Bax, Handbook.
124 Weber, History.
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